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Abstract
The paper studies the problem of auction design in a setting where the auctioneer accesses
the knowledge of the valuation distribution only through statistical samples. A new framework is
established that combines the statistical decision theory with mechanism design. Two optimality
criteria, maxmin, and equivariance, are studied along with their implications on the form of
auctions. The simplest form of the equivariant auction is the average bid auction, which set
individual reservation prices proportional to the average of other bids and historical samples.
This form of auction can be motivated by the Gamma distribution, and it sheds new light on
the estimation of the optimal price, an irregular parameter. Theoretical results show that it is
often possible to use the regular parameter population mean to approximate the optimal price.
An adaptive average bid estimator is developed under this idea, and it has the same asymptotic
properties as the empirical Myerson estimator. The new proposed estimator has a significantly
better performance in terms of value at risk and expected shortfall when the sample size is small.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies the problem of auction design under the assumption that the optimal reserva-
tion price is unknown due to the lack of exact knowledge of the valuation distribution. Instead,
independent samples recorded from past auctions are assumed to be available to the auctioneer.
In the classical Bayesian mechanism design literature, the auctioneer knows the distribution
from which the bidders’ valuations are drawn.1 In this case, the optimal auction is derived in the
seminal work of Myerson (1981), which is in the form of a second-price auction with the optimal
reservation price. The optimal reserve price depends on the valuation distribution through
ppF q “ arg max
p
pp1´ F ppqq, (1)
where F is the valuation distribution. The job of acquiring a reasonable estimate of the optimal
price is left to the statisticians and computer scientists. So the complete process of auction design
is divided artificially into two steps: (i) deriving the optimal price as if the distribution were known,
and then (ii) approximating this price with data.
However, as shown in the paper, the price ppF q is not a pathwise differentiable functional of the
distribution F ; thus, it can only be estimated at rates slower than the n1{2-rate. This is because
the optimal reserve price depends on the density, which can only be estimated at a slower rate if no
parametric form is imposed. A natural question arises that, when considering the entire problem,
whether it would be favorable to sacrifice the optimality in the first step (when the distribution is
known) in exchange for a faster convergence rate in the second step by targeting a suboptimal but
regular parameter.
The investigation begins by framing the problem inside the statistical decision framework, where
the allocation rule and transfer payments of an auction are the statistical decision rules with
the bids and historical samples being the data inputs. In this framework of statistical auction
design under finite sample, methods that resemble statistical estimation are integrated into the
classical mechanism design theory that mainly deals with the incentive compatibility issues under
asymmetric information. The maxmin and equivariance principles are studied. The framework
encompasses two special cases. First, when there are no available historical samples, then the
problem becomes the classical mechanism design2. Second, when there is only one bidder, then the
problem becomes monopolistic pricing with samples.
As a result, a new form of auction, called the average bid auction, is proposed. It assigns the
auction item to the bidder with the highest valuation. Each bidder faces an individual reserva-
tion price that is proportional to the average of other bidders’ bids and historical samples. This is
because, for each bidder, the other bids plays the same role as the sample observations in construct-
ing the estimator of the optimal price. In contrast, his own bid has to be excluded for incentive
1The usage of “prior” and “Bayesian” in this literature is somewhat different from that in statistics. The buyers’
valuations are modeled as random variables in this context, whose distribution is referred to as the prior, and Bayesian
means that the designer knows this distribution.
2Even in this case, the paper still contributes to the literature by studying the equivariance principle.
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compatibility issues.
This simple form of average is motivated using the Gamma distribution, but it has surprising
insights for the estimation of ppF q. A set of interesting findings shows that the population mean
often serves as a useful reference point for the optimal price. Based on this idea, the paper proposes
an adaptive way to conduct the average bid procedure, which uses the a pilot estimator for the
coefficient in the average bid procedure. This adaptive estimator has the same asymptotic properties
as the empirical Myerson estimator, and it has a significantly better performance in terms of value
at risk and expected shortfall when the sample size is small.
1.1 Related Literature
In the economics literature, empirical estimates have been obtained for the independent private
value auctions. Paarsch (1997) uses a parametric approach. For nonparametric estimation, Athey
et al. (2002) considers solving the first-order condition of (1) after estimating the density of F .
Another popular approach is to directly maxmimize the empirical version of (1). Studies related to
this approach include Segal (2003); Prasad (2008); Coey et al. (2020). This method can be referred
to as the empirical Myerson auction because the price is set as if the empirical distribution is the
true distribution F .
Studies of similar topics can be found under the name of algorithmic mechanism design in the
theoretical computer science literature, including works by Cole and Roughgarden (2014); Dhang-
watnotai et al. (2015); Huang et al. (2018); Guo et al. (2019). The primary solution understudy
in this literature is the empirical Myerson auction and its variants. As summarized in Babaioff
et al. (2018), the two directions studied so far in this literature are two opposite directions: that of
asymptotic results where only the rate of convergence is of concern, and that where only a single
sample is available. The adaptive average bid procedure proposed in the paper partially fills this
important gap between the large sample case and the one (or two) sample case.
There is a massive amount of literature on the structural econometrics on auction, as recently
surveyed by Perrigne and Vuong (2019). The main goal of this literature is to identify and estimate
the valuation distribution from the observed bids in first-price auctions. However, this paper as-
sumes that the samples come from a truthful mechanism, where the bids are equal to the valuations
themselves, so identification is no longer a problem. Instead, this paper pushes the task one step
further, asking the question on how to set the allocation rule with a finite sample when all relevant
quantities are identified.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the statistical auction
design framework, where statistical methods are integrated into the classical mechanism design
theory. Section 3 studies general results regarding the maxmin and equivariant principle. Section
4 motivates the average bid auction under Gamma distribution. Section 5 proposes the adaptive
average bid procdure and studies its performance under general distributional assumptions both
theoretically and with simulations. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A contains tables for simulation
results. Proofs are collected in Appendix B.
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2 Statistical Auction Design
There is a single item to sell. There are k bidders, whose valuations of the item are collected in
V “ pV1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Vkq. Each bidder knows his own valuation. The seller doesn’t observe the valuations,
instead he observes a collection of n samples W “ pW1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,Wnq, possibly from past auctions run
on similar items.3 The valuations V1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Vk and samples W1, ¨ ¨ ¨ ,Wn are i.i.d. draws from the
same distribution F . Throughout the paper, F is assumed to be absolute continuous, with support
rv, v¯s or rv,8q where v ě 0.
An auction is defined by the allocation rule, which determines to whom the item is sold, and
the payment rule, which determines the transfer of money from the buyers to the seller. The seller
makes these decisions based on the collected bids and the sample data. The formal definition is as
follows.
Definition 1. A statistical auction consists of functions qi and ti for i “ 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , k, where qi :
Rk` ˆ Rn` Ñ r0, 1s, such that
řn
i“1 qi ď 1, and ti : Rk` ˆ Rn` Ñ R.
The inputs of the statistical auction are bids b P Rk` and samples w P Rn`. Each qipb,wq is
the probability of assigning the item to bidder i, and tipb,wq is the payment from bidder i to the
seller. The condition
řk
i“1 qi ď 1 simply means that the allocation probabilities sum up to 1, in
particular, 1 ´řki“1 qi is the probability that the item is not sold. Note that a classical auction
without the samples can be treated as a special case where n “ 0. It is worthy to note that the
revelation principle applies in this setting, so the restriction to the direct mechanism is without
loss of generality.
The expected revenue Rpq, F q from implementing the rule q under the distribution F is defined
as
Rpq, F q “
kÿ
i“1
E rtipV,Wqs , (2)
which is the sum of the expected payment from each bidder. The expectation is taken over both
the valuations V and samples W.
Since the bidders are strategic players in the auction, there are some sensible restrictions to place
on the form of the statistical auction. Each bidder i reports bid bi based on his own valuations.
The quasilinear form of utility is assumed, which for each bidder i is defined as viqipb,wq´tipb,wq.
When bidder i is bidding his own valuation vi, he receives utility
Uipvi,b´i,wq “ viqippvi,b´iq,wq ´ tippvi,b´iq,wq.
where b´i P Rk´1` is the set of bids from bidders other than i, and pvi,b´iq is a complete set of
bids that combines vi and b´i. It is desired that the auction to be designed in a way that the
3The W ’s can also be considered as independent signals of the valuation distribution F . If they come from different
auctions, then F is the probability measure of the bigger population encompassing all these auctions. We do not
need to assume that the bidders observe W.
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bidders reveal their true valuations under any distribution F . In other words, bidding truthfully is
a dominant strategy for each bidder, as defined in the following.
Definition 2. A statistical auction is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) if for any
bidder i, it holds for all vi, bi,b´i, and w that
Uipvi,b´i,wq ě viqippbi,b´iq,wq ´ tippbi,b´iq,wq.
The other important constraint is called individual rationality, which means that the bidders’
utility cannot go below some lower bound so that they are willing to participate in the auction in
the first place.
Definition 3. A statistical auction is individual rational (IR) if for any bidder i, it holds for all
vi,b´i, and w that Uipvi,b´i,wq ě 0.
Since the bids in DSIC auctions are the valuations, henceforth the notation vi will be used
to represent both the valuation and the bid for bidder i. A relationship between q and t can be
derived for any auction that satisfies DSIC and IR, which is the well-known Revenue Equivalence
Principle in mechanism design theory. The following lemma is the statistical version of this result
that involves the sample W.
Lemma 1. (Revenue Equivalence) A statistical auction pq, tq is DSIC if and only if, for each bidder
i it holds that
(i) qi ppvi,v´iq,wq is non-decreasing in vi.
(ii) For every vi in the support of F , the transfer payment satisfies:
tippvi,v´iq,wq “ viqipv,wq ´
ż vi
0
qippu,v´iq,wqdu´ Uippv,v´iq,wq.
Moreover, if pq, tq maximizes the auctioneer’s expected revenue, then
tippvi,v´iq,wq “ viqipv,wq ´
ż vi
0
qippu,v´iq,wqdu. (3)
This lemma means that, without loss of optimality, the allocation rule q “ tqiuki“1 completely
determines the transfer payment t “ ttiuki“1, hence the statistical auction. Throughout the paper,
statistical auctions are considered to be of the form in Equation (3), and the allocation rule is often
used to denote the corresponding auction. Below are some examples of statistical auctions in view
of Lemma 1.
Example 1. Consider the case of one bidder and one sample, i.e. k “ n “ 1. Let the allocation
rule be q1pv1, w1q “ 1tv1 ą w1u. Then the associated payment is
t1pv1, w1q “ v11tv1 ą w1u ´
ż v1
0
1tu ą w1udu “
$&%w1, if v1 ą w10, if v1 ă w1.
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This is the single sample identity pricing rule, where the seller posts a price equal to the sample
observation.
Example 2. When k “ 2 and n “ 1, there are 2 bidders and 1 sample. Let the allocation rule be
qipvi, vi1 , w1q “ 1tvi ą vi1 , vi ą w1u, i ‰ i1 P t1, 2u,
which means the item is allocated to the bidder with bids higher than both the sample and the other
bid. The associated payment is
tipvi, vi1 , w1q “
$’’’&’’’%
vi1, if vi ą vi1 ą w1
w1, if vi ą w1 ą vi1
0, if vi ă w1.
This is the second-price auction with a reservation price set equal to the sample observation.
The discussion up to this point does not involve the distribution F , because we are considering
dominant strategies. The next step is to characterize the optimal revenue when F is known to the
seller, so as to provide a reference point for the revenue earned by any statistical auction. Two
useful definitions are introduced. Let f be the pdf of F .
Definition 4. For a absolute continuous distribution F , the virtual valuation is defined as
φF pvq “ vi ´ 1´ F pviq
fpviq .
The distribution F is said to be regular if φF is strictly increasing. Let ppF q be defined as the
unique root of φF p¨q “ 04.
Combining Lemma 1 with Equation (2), the revenue has a more explicit representation as
Rpq, F q “
kÿ
i“1
E rqipV,WqφF pViqs .
This is the statistical version of what is being referred to as the Myerson’s lemma in the literature,
which is very useful in a lot of the derivations afterwards.
When F is regular, Myerson (1981) showed that the optimal auction qF is the second price
auction with reserve price ppF q. Note that when F is known, the optimal auction no longer
depends on the sample W. The allocation rule for this auction is
qFi pvq “ 1tvi ą max
i1‰i vi
1 , vi ą ppF qu.5
4This is equivalent to the definition in Equation (1)
5Thoughout the paper, the case of multiple winners (vi “ maxi1‰i vi1) is ignored, since the distributions under
consideration are absolute continuous.
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Example 3. Consider F to be the exponential distribution, i.e. fpvq “ e´v. The virtual valuation
function φF pvq “ v´ 1 is increasing. The optimal reserve price is ppF q “ 1. The Myerson optimal
allocation rule is qFi pvq “ 1tvi ą maxi1‰i vi1 , vi ą 1u.
With a little abuse of notation, denote the optimal revenue under F as RpF q “ RpqF , F q. The
utility function of the auctioneer in the entire statistical auction design problem is modeled as the
ratio between the expected revenue and the optimal revenue. I call it the regret ratio, of statistical
auction q under a regular distribution F ,
rpq, F q “ Rpq, F q
RpF q .
The name regret ratio follows from the fact that each auction is valued based not on the absolute
revenue gained but on the relative revenue compared to the best achievable revenue under the same
distribution.6 The regret ratio is a solid choice of the objective function from the decision-theoretic
perspective, as explained in the next section, along with the maxmin criterion.
3 Optimality Criteria
3.1 Maximin Principle
The maxmin principle is used to protect against the worst possible distribution. It ranks the
decision rules based on their worst-case performances. In statistics, it is often referred to as the
minimax principle, for the utility function is expressed in terms of loss. Let Q denote the set of
all allocation rules that satisfies the first condition in Lemma 1. The formal definition of maxmin
auction is as follows.
Definition 5. Given a class of distributions F , a DSIC statistical auction q is maxmin if
inf
FPF rpq, F q “ supq1PQ infFPF rpq
1, F q. (4)
Since the objective is the regret ratio function, the principle can also be considered as maxmin-
regret in this case. The maxmin-regret principle is commonly applied in the treatment assignment
literature (Manski, 2004; Stoye, 2009, 2012; Tetenov, 2012).7 However, instead of using the ratio
as the regret, those works use the difference between the best achievable and the achieved as the
regret. To distinguish, the latter is referred to as regret difference. Arguably, the regret ratio is a
better quantity in measuring the relative gains. Because the range of the regret difference varies
with the magnitude of the best achievable revenue, while the regret ratio always lies within the unit
interval. This property renders the regret ratios comparable across different distributions. Despite
this imparity, the two types of regret play the common role in avoiding selecting the trivial rule that
6It is also sometimes called the competitive ratio.
7Besides these works on finite-sample maxmin regret analysis, Kitagawa and Tetenov (2018) also studies the
welfare regret from the perspective of non-asymptotic risk bound.
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completely ignores information contained in the data.8 A discussion on this issue can be found in
Sadler (2015). For a thorough comparison among maxmin, maxmin regret difference, and maxmin
regret ratio, from an axiomatic perspective, the readers are referred to Brafman and Tennenholtz
(2000).
The maxmin procedure can also be seen as a zero-sum game played by the auctioneer against
nature. The auctioneer picks a statistical auction q P Q, while nature picks a distribution F P
F . The set Q is already convexified by the randomization as in Definition 1. Nature can also
randomized. To avoid technical issues, assume F is finite-dimensional. The nature’s mixed strategy
is a prior distribution pi P ∆pFq. Nature’s payoff is given by the negative of the regret ratio. A
well-known result is that if the game has a Nash equilibrium pq˚, pi˚q, then q˚ is a maxmin auction.
The prior pi˚ is called least favorable prior. This fact alleviates the difficulty in proving maxminity
since now one only needs to show that q˚ is the best response against pi˚, and vice versa.
The item in the auction often possesses attributes that covariate with its valuation. The at-
tribute is modeled by a finite-valued covariate X supported on X . Denote Fx P F as the conditional
distribution of the valuation given X “ x. The sample data is the set tpWj , Xjqunj“1. The vector
of samples W can be partitioned according to the covariate, W “ tWx : x P X u, where each Wx
contains the sample valuations whose associated attribute is x. The elements in Wx are iid draws
from Fx. The covariate of the item in the current auction is also observed. When the attribute
of the current item is observed to be x, the DSIC bids contained in V are considered as equal in
distribution to elements in Wx.
An illustrative example is provided to enhance understanding. Consider the auction on an
antique china teacup. Historical data contains transaction prices, from second-price auction con-
ducted in the past, for both antique china teacups and plates. The attribute, in this case, is binary,
representing teacup or plate. The bidders’ valuations for the teacup in this auction is assumed
to share a common distribution with the historical prices of teacups in the data, while potentially
distributed differently from the prices of plates. The next goal is to show that the maxmin auction
only uses the data for teacups to estimate the optimal reserve price, and completely ignores the
data for plates.
With more information at hand, the auctioneer can condition the allocation on the covariate.
Denote this more general form of allocation rule by κ “ tκx : x P X u, where each x signifies the
attribute of the item in the current auction. Each conditional allocation κx pV,W,Xq depends on
the entire set of available information. The notation q pV,Wq is retained for the previously defined
unconditional auction. It is important to note that, even after fixing the value x, the auction κx
is still different from an unconditional one in the sense that the elements in W can be treated
differently accordingly to the value of X. The expected revenue, for an item with attribute x, is
R
´
κx, F˜
¯
“ E
«
kÿ
i“1
φFxpViqκx pV,W,Xq
ff
,
8See Manski (2004) and Savage (1954) for illustrative examples on this issue.
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where F˜ “ tFx : x P X u P FX . Dividing R
´
κx, F˜
¯
by R˚pFxq gives the conditional version of
regret ratio r
´
κx, F˜
¯
. The maxmin problem becomes finding a κx for each x such that
inf
F˜PFX
rpκx, F˜ q “ sup
κx
inf
F˜PFX
rpq, F˜ q, (5)
where κx varies in the set of all conditional auctions, and nature is allowed to vary each Fx in
F without any restrictions. Note that the regret ratio also implicitly depends on the marginal
distribution of X, but nature is assumed not to manipulate that. In fact, as shown in the proof of
Proposition 1 the marginal distribution of X does not affect the maxmin auction.
For any unconditional rule q as described in Definition 1, one can define a set of associated
conditional auctions tκx, x P X u, that uses no cross-covariate information, by letting
κx pV,W,Xq “ q pV,Wxq . (6)
Essentially, the conditional auction κx discards all samples with covariate value different than x,
and proceed with the allocation q.
Proposition 1. Assume that the unconditional rule q˚ is the maxmin solution to (4), with the least
favorable prior being pi˚ P ∆F . Then the associated conditional auction κx˚, as defined in Equation
(6), is the maxmin solution to (5).
This type of result first appears in Stoye (2009). The intuition is that nature can choose a prior
that renders the data Wx1 uninformative about items with attribute x ‰ x1. Then the auctioneer is
best responding by discarding irrelevant information. This result provides practical guidance from
the maxmin principle that only the most relevant data should be used in designing an auction on
a specific item. However, this means that, in each auction, the effective sample size is going to
be relatively small. To overcome this issue, a form of auction is introduced in the next section
that performed particularly well under small to moderate sample size. Before that, another useful
statistical decision principle is studied.
3.2 Equivariance Principle
The equivariance principle, in statistical estimation problems, is a group-theoretic formalization of
certain intuitively appealing decisions. This intuition, in the context of statistical auction design,
is that the final allocation should not be altered if the monetary unit of the bids and samples are
changed. More specifically, if the auctioneer decides to allocate the item to a bidder when the input
data are in dollars, then it is natural to assume that this decision remains the same when the input
data are in Yen.
Besides this intuitive argument, there are many practical reasons for employing the equivariance
principle. First, the equivariance simplies the maximization of the regret ratio. Proposition 2 shows
that the regret ratio of an equivariant auction is constant along each scale family. Second, as in
9
the estimation problem, the equivariance principle provides an effective way to restrict the set of
statistical rules under consideration. As shown in Proposition 3, the optimal equivariant auction
derived under a specific distributional assumption does not ignore the data. For this purpose, the
equivariance principle is similar to unbiasedness principle, except that there is no natural analog of
unbiasedness in auction design. Another reason is that the relationship between equivariance and
maxmin through the generalized Hunt-Stein theorem, which states that the maxmin equivariant
rule is maxmin overall. This is addressed in the next subsection after the introduction of the
maxmin principle.
We first introduce the equivariance structure in the statistical auction design problem. Consider
in turn the scale transformation on three types of objects: distribution of valuations, bids and
samples, and the payment transfer. For any regular F and θ ą 0, let Fθ denote the CDF of θV ,
i.e. Fθpvq “ F
`
v
θ
˘
. The corresponding density is fθpvq “ 1θf
`
v
θ
˘
. The following lemma shows that
the optimal revenue, from the Myerson auction, is scale-equivariant.
Lemma 2. For any regular F and θ ą 0, we have ppFθq “ θppF q, and RpFθq “ θRpF q.
Next, define a special class of statistical allocation rules, that are invariant to the scale trans-
formation on bids and samples.
Definition 6. An allocation rule is (scale-)invariant if, for any θ ą 0,
qpθv, θwq “ qpv,wq, v P Rk`,w P Rn`. (7)
A statistical auction is (scale-)equivariant if its allocation is (scale-)invariant.
Lemma 3. For a scale-invariant allocation rule, the associated payment transfer rule satisfies, for
any θ ą 0 and i “ 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , n,
tipθv, θwq “ θtipv,wq, v P Rk`,w P Rn`.
Lemma 3 justifies the name “equivariant” by showing that for any scale-invariant allocation,
the associated payment transfer is scale-equivariant.9 The behavior of the scale transformation is
summarized by Lemma 2 and Lemma 3. There is a notable difference between these two lemmas.
The revenue from the Myerson optimal auction is equivariant when the distribution scales by θ.
The revenue from the equivariant statistical auction is equivariant when the input valuations and
samples scale by θ. In particular, fix a distribution F , the revenue from the Myerson optimal
auction is not equivariant.
In the literature, a discussion on the formalized equivariance principle can be found in Allouah
and Besbes (2018) in the setting of auction design with two bidders (and no sample). Most common
auctions are in the equivariant form, including the first and second-price auctions. The equivariant
9The usage of “equivariant” and “invariant” in the text is the same as in “equivariant estimator” and “invariant
test” in traditional statistics literature.
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auction does not the information on the magnitudes of the valuations and samples, since it can be
represented as a function of the ratios:
q
ˆ
v1
wn
, ¨ ¨ ¨ , vk
wn
,
w1
wn
, ¨ ¨ ¨ , wn´1
wn
, 1
˙
.
The auctions in Example 1 and 2 are both equivariant. Because the allocation in Example 1 is
qpv1, w1q “ q pv1{w1, 1q “ 1tv1{w1 ą 1u,
and the allocation in Example 2 is
q1pv1, v2, w1q “ q1pv1{w1, v2{w1, 1q “ 1tv1{w1 ą 1, pv1{w1q{pv2{w1q ą 1u,
q2pv1, v2, w1q “ q2pv1{w1, v2{w1, 1q “ 1tv1{w1 ă 1, pv1{w1q{pv2{w1q ă 1u.
To complete the equivariance structure, we show that the regret ratio of any equivariant auction
is constant with respect to the scale parameter of the valuation distribution. From Lemma 2 and
Lemma 3 state that when the distribution scales by θ, both the optimal revenue and the expected
revenue from an equivariant statistical auction scale by θ. Thus, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. For any regular distribution F , and equivariant auction, it holds that
rpq, Fθq “ rpq, Fθ1q, for any θ, θ1 ą 0.
The statistical auction design problem is equivariant with respect to the group of scale trans-
formations. In the group-theoretic language, the set tFθ : θ ą 0u is called an orbit, within which
the regret ratio is constant. The most straightforward result from the equivariance principle is to
simplify the space of distributions by collapsing it into the sets of orbits.
By the generalize the Hunt Stein theorem we can expect the maxmin equivariant auction to be
the overall maxmin auction. The mathematical statement is
sup
qPQe
inf
FPF rpq, F q “ supqPQ infFPF rpq, F q,
where Qe Ă Q denotes the set of all equivariant auctions. This means in finding the maxmin sta-
tistical auction, attentions can be restricted to the equivariant auctions. Bondar and Milnes (1981)
shows that such result holds when the associated group transformation satisfies the amenability
condition. And they have also shown that the scale transformation group (possibly one of the sim-
plest transformation group) is amenable. See Chapter 5 of Lehmann and Casella (2006), Bondar
and Milnes (1981), and Wesler (1959) for more discussions of the generalized Hunt-Stein theorem.
Next, we study the general structure of the optimal equivairant auction. The following propo-
sition shows the common representation of the optimal equivariant auction against a given scale
family of valuation distributions.
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Proposition 3 (General Representation for Equivariant Auctions). For any regular distribution
F , the optimal equivariant auction that maximizes the regret ratio for the scale family tFθ : θ ą 0u
has the allocation rule of the form
qF,ipV,Wq “ 1
"
Vi ą ρF pV´i,Wq, Vi ą max
i1‰i Vi
1
*
, i “ 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , k, (8)
where ρF is symmetric and homogeneous of degree one. When mintk, nu Ñ 8, ρF pV´i,Wq con-
verges in probability to ppF q.
There are several features to the form of auction in (8). Notice that the denominator of the
regret ratio, the optimal revenue, is a constant in this case. So the auctioneer only needs to focus
on optimizing the revenue. The resulting auction is standard in the sense that a bidder wins only
if his bid is the highest, which is represented by the part “Vi ą maxi1‰i Vi1”. There is an individual
reservation price ρF pV´i,Wq for each bidder i. In order to be the winner, the bidder needs to have
a valuation higher than this reservation price.
In setting the price for each bidder i, the effective sample used is in fact pV´i,Wq, where bidder
i’s own valuation Vi is excluded for the incentive compatibility issue. So the effective sample size
is k ` n´ 1. Using the law of iterated expectations, the revenue from a bidder i can be written as
E rqipV,WqφF pViqs
“E
„
qi
ˆ
V1
Wn
, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Vk
Wn
,
W1
Wn
, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Wn´1
Wn
, 1
˙
φ˜F
ˆ
V1
Wn
, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Vk
Wn
,
W1
Wn
, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Wn´1
Wn
˙
,
(9)
where
φ˜F
ˆ
V1
Wn
, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Vk
Wn
,
W1
Wn
, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Wn´1
Wn
˙
“ E
«
φF pViq
ˇˇˇˇ
ˇ V1Wn , ¨ ¨ ¨ , VkWn , W1Wn , ¨ ¨ ¨ , Wn´1Wn
ff
(10)
can be considered as the equivariant version of the virtual valuation. In Myerson (1981), the optimal
reserve price is derived as the root of the virtual valuation function. Similarly, here the reserve price
ρF pV´i,Wq is derived based on the root of the equivariant virtual valuation φ˜F . From the classical
estimation viewpoint, we can consider ρF pV´i,Wq as an equivariant estimator of the optimal price
ppF q with the risk function being designed as the (negative) regret ratio.
The estimator ρF pV´i,Wq consistently estimates the true optimal price when there is a large
number of bidders or samples because then the auctioneer can estimate the valuation distribution
accurately. The function ρF is symmetric so other bidders’ valuations V´i and the samples W play
the exact same role in setting the individual reservation price. The fact that the samples W are
utilized already shows the power of the equivariance principle. Because the overall optimal auction
is not equivariant and completely ignores the samples W since it set the reservation price to be
ppF q .
When the sample size n is large, little is lost if we ignore the information in V´i and using
W alone to estimate the reserve price. However, in the finite sample case, when k and n are of
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the same magnitude, it is rather important to take advantage of the information coming from the
current auction.
4 Average Bid Auction
After discussion on the general representation of equivariant auctions, we study a specific form
of the equivariant auction. The simpliest form of ρF one can think of is perhaps the average
S¯´i “ 1k`n´1
´řk
i1‰i Vi1 `
řn
j“1Wj
¯
over the effective sample pV´i,Wq. Following this idea, the
average bid (AB) auction qβ is defined as:
qβ,ipV,Wq “ 1
"
Vi ą βS¯´i, Vi ą max
i1‰i Vi
1
*
, i “ 1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , k, (11)
where β is a positive constant. The abbreviation AB-β is used when the coefficient β is under
discussion. We can see that the AB-β auction sets the reserve price to be β times the sample
average.
In the case of one bidder and one sample (k “ n “ 1), the AB-β auction sets the price to
be βW1. It is shown in Huang et al. (2018) that, for distributions with increasing hazard rate
p1´ F q{f , the pricing rule 0.85W1 guarantees a regret ratio of 0.589, while the empirical Myerson
pricing rule (1) only attains the maxmin regret ratio of 0.5. Notice that, in this case, the empirical
Myerson pricing rule sets the price to the observed sample W1, and it is also called the single sample
identity pricing rule. When there are more than one bidder and sample observation, we proceed
to show that the AB auction is optimal under the Gamma distribution. Then in the next section,
we show that the AB auction is favorable in the finite-sample setting under general distributional
assumptions.
4.1 Optimal Equivariant Auction
Statisticians studying finite-sample estimation and hypothesis testing have long made progress by
imposing parametric assumptions to make the problem tractable. Similarly, we make progress in
this section by restricting attention inside the Gamma family. The choice of Gamma distribution
in the auction data analysis is not new (see e.g. Friedman, 1956; Hossein Bor, 1977; Skitmore, 2014;
Takano et al., 2014). In a more recent paper, Ballesteros-Pe´rez and Skitmore (2017) shows Gamma
distribution is among the distributions that provide the best fit to the empirical auction data.
The Gamma family of distributions has densities of the form
fpv, α, θq “ θ
αvα´1e´v{θ
Γpαq , α ě 1, θ ą 0,
where Γ is the Gamma function, and α, θ are respectively the shape and scale parameter. We first
fix α, and study the optimal equivariant auction for the scale family tfp¨, α, θq : θ ą 0u. Then we
can let θ “ 1 since the regret ratio does not depend on θ due to Proposition 2. In the rest of this
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section, quantities that depends on the distribution F are indexed by α.
Following Proposition 3 and the discussion after it, we know the form of the equivariant reserve
price ρα depends on maxmizing the revenue from one bidder (without constraining the sum of qi’s
to be less than 1). Without loss of generality, we study the revenue from bidder 1 and normalize
the other valuations and samples by the valuation V1:
E rt1pV,Wqs “
ż
q1pv,wqφαpv1q
kź
i“1
fpvi, α, 1q
nź
j“1
fpwj , α, 1qdvdw
“
ż
q1
ˆ
1
v1
v,
1
v1
w
˙
φαpv1q
kź
i“1
fpv1 ¨ pvi{v1q, α, 1q
nź
j“1
fpv1 ¨ pwj{v1q, α, 1qdvdw
“
ż
q1 pσq dσ
ż
φαpv1q
k`nź
i“1
fpv1σi, α, 1qvn`k´11 dv1,
(12)
where the change of variable σ “ p1, σ2, ¨ ¨ ¨ , σk`nq “ p1, v2{v1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , vk{v1, w1{v1, ¨ ¨ ¨ , wn{v1q is used.
So q1 has been taken out from the first layer of integration. To study the first layer of integration,
define a function
ϕmpσ, αq “
ż 8
0
φαpvq
mź
i“1
fpv1σi, α, 1qvm´1dv
“Γp1`mαq
Γpαqm
˜
mź
i“2
σi
¸α´1
ˆ
»–˜1` mÿ
i“2
σi
¸´1´mα
´ 2F1 p1` pm´ 1qα, 1`mα, 2` pm´ 1qα,´p
řm
i“2 σiqq
1` pm´ 1qα
fifl .
where 2F1 is the Gaussian hypergeometric function.
10 Also define ϕ0m as the factor of ϕm that only
depends on the sum
řm
i“2 σi,
ϕ0mps, αq “ Γp1` pm` 1qαqΓpαqpm`1q
„
p1` sq´1´pm`1qα ´ 2F1 p1`mα, 1` pm` 1qα, 2`mα,´sq
1`mα

.
We can see that the sign of ϕm is completelt determined by the sign of ϕ
0
m, that is,
sgnpϕmpσ, αqq “ sgn
˜
ϕ0m
˜
mÿ
i“2
σi, α
¸¸
.
10 This equality can be verified using Mathematica. The hypergeometric function is defined as the analytic con-
tinuation of the power series
2F1pa, b, c, xq “
8ÿ
n“0
paqnpbqn
pcqn
xn
n!
, |x| ă 1,
where paqn “ apa` 1q ¨ ¨ ¨ pa` n´ 1q1tn ě 1u, and pbqn, pcqn defined similarly.
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Therefore, the maximizer q1 of (12) is only a function of
řk`n´1
i“2 σi “ p
řk
i“2 vi `
řn
j“1wjq{v1.11
Combining this fact with the general representation of equivariant auction in Proposition 3, we
know the equivariant reserve ρα must be proportional to the sample average S¯´i. Thus, we have
proved the following corollary.
Corollary 1. The AB-β auction is the optimal equivariant auction for the scale Gamma family
tfp¨, α, θq : θ ą 0u, where the constant β depends on k, n, and α.
Figure 1 graphs the functions ϕ0mps, αq for m “ 3, 4 and α “ 1.5, 2.0, 2.5. Each curve starts as
a decreasing function, crosses the horizontal axis once from above, and then starts increasing. In
fact, the two axes are the two asymptotes of the curve. However, these properties are not required
for the proof of Corollary 1. The optimal equivariant auction is of the average bid form as long as
the sign of ϕm only depends on the sum of ratios
řm
i“2 σi.
Figure 1: The graph of ϕ03ps, αq and ϕ04ps, αq for different values of α.
Even though the knowledge of α is assumed, the resulting auction is still useful for practical
purposes due to the equivariance restriction as mentioned before. The effective sample average
S¯´i is the method of moment estimator for α when θ “ 1. Without the equivariance restriction,
S¯´i would be replaced by its true value α in the AB auction, then the resulting auction would
not be equivariant and is less practical since it requires the exact knowledge of α. Also, the use
of estimator S¯´i in the optimal auction verifies the findings in Zaigraev and Podraza-Karakulska
(2008) that, the moment based estimator performs better than the maximum likelihood estimator,
in terms of both finite sample bias and variance for the estimation of α.
If the AB-β auction is the unique optimal equivariant auction under α, then it is an admissible
equivariant auction among all regular distributions, which means its regret ratio cannot be entirely
dominated by another equivariant auction. Such uniqueness is guaranteed if ϕ0k`n ą 0 has a unique
root.12
11The condition v1 ą maxi1‰1 vi1 is not incorporated into the expression since ři qi ď 1 is not yet imposed.
12This property is shown in Figure 1 rather than being proved mathematically.
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Figure 2: Optimal coefficient β under different m and α.
By the equivalence between ϕ0k`n ą 0 and v1 ą βS¯´i, we know pk ` n ´ 1q{β is the root of
ϕ0k`np¨, αq. Figure 2 shows the value of β computed by the numerical root of ϕ0k`np¨, αq. The β
curve increases to the “true value” ppαq{α very rapidly as k`n increases. This observation, together
with the fact that S¯´i consistently estimates α, verifies the consistency statement in Proposition
3. Figure 2 also shows another important fact that ppαq{α is bounded in the tight r0.7, 1s for all
α. This means that any choice of β in such region is a reasonable one for the Gamma family.
4.2 Maxmin Auction
The previous discussion is based on the case that the shape parameter α is known. Next, an
informal discussion is provided on how to find the maxmin auction under the Gamma distribution
family with an unknown shape parameter α. As explained earlier, the maxmin solution can be
found through a game-theoretic approach. The mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium corresponds to
the maxmin solution of the problem.
The shape of the regret ratio curve can be derived from Figure 2. Consider setting β to
be somewhere in r0.8, 0.9s, say, then as α increases from 1, the regret ratio first increases, then
decreases, and eventually increases again. So for a careful choice of β, it is possible that the regret
ratio have two minima, one at α “ 1 and the other at α˚. When the regret ratio have two minima,
any probability mixture between the two minima is a best response for nature. If for a certain
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mixture qβ is the auctioneer’s best response, then we have pinned down the maxmin auction.
Figure 3: Flattened Two-Bidder Regret Ratio Curves.
Figure 3 shows the simulated regret ratios curves of qβ for the case of two bidders and multiple
samples with β selected so that the curves approximately has two minima. The smaller minima
are at 1, and the larger minima are around 10. This verifies the conjecture about the shape of
the regret ratio curve. Nature’s best response is a prior over t1, α˚u. Denote pi as the probability
of nature choosing 1, and 1 ´ pi is the probability of nature choosing α˚. Given this prior, the
auctioneer chooses the auction that maximizes the Bayesian regret ratio pirpq, 1q ` p1´ piqrpq, α˚q,
which is a linear combination of Rpq, 1q and Rpq, α˚q. So the optimal form of auction is still the
AB auction. And with a careful choice of pi, one can get the desired value of β as the best response
of the auctioneer.
From a practical point of view, the goal of the maxmin procedure is to flatten the regret ratio
curve so the corresponding statistical auction has stable performance. This goal is clearly achieved
as in Figure 3, where each regret ratio curve is approxmately flat. With only 5 samples, the AB-β
auction (with β “ 0.913) for 2 bidders guarantees more than 94% of the optimal revenue.
5 General Performance
The main feature of the AB auction is that it uses (a fraction of) the sample average to estimate the
optimal price ppF q. To make this feature more salient, we study the case of monopolistic pricing
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where there is only one buyer. In this case, the AB-β auction amounts to setting the price to be
pˆβ “ βW¯n “ β
n
nÿ
j“1
Wj .
The alternative estimator for comparison purpose is the empirical Myerson (EM) estimator com-
monly seen in the literature. The EM procedure estimates the reservation price by maximizing the
expected revenue over the empirical distribution of the sample W, that is,
pˆEM “ arg max
p
p
˜
1
n
nÿ
i“1
1tWi ě pu
¸
. (13)
This can be considered as the empirical version of Equation (1). This estimator can be made more
robust against heavy tail distributions by trimming the large observations (see e.g. Dhangwatnotai
et al., 2015; Huang et al., 2018).
5.1 A Two-Step Approximation
The mechanism design theory suggests that ppF q is the optimal price. In other words, ppF q is the
target parameter. The usual way to proceed would be to find an estimator that works based on
asymptotic theory. For example, such estimator is often consistent and converges to the target
parameter at a certain rate. However, as shown by Prasad (2008), the convergence rate of the
EM estimator pˆEM is n
1{3, which is considerably slower than the usual n1{2 rate.13. Moreover, the
following result states that this slow convergence rate is not peculiar to the EM estimator. In fact,
ppF q itself is not a regular parameter in the appropriate sense.
Proposition 4. The parameter ppF q as a functional of F is not pathwise differentiable in the sense
of Van Der Vaart (1991), hence it is not
?
n-estimable.
Therefore, even though the EM estimator seems to be a natural choice from the asymptotics
viewpoint, it may not have desired performance when the sample size is finite due to its slow
convergence rate. Based on this observation, the estimation of ppF q by using pˆβ can be considered
as a two-step approximation. In the first step, the irregular parameter ppF q is approximated by
a regular parameter βµpF q, where µpF q denotes the population mean of the distribution F . In
the second step, the parameter βµpF q is approximated by the estimator pˆβ. The sample average
is a regular estimator for the population mean. So if in the first step βµpF q can approximate
ppF q well, then the AB estimator p¯β can quickly converge to the neighborhood region of ppF q even
with a small smaple size. So the two-step approximation can be seen as a regularization in the
finite-sample estimation of the irregular parameter ppF q. While the EM estimator outperforms the
AB estimator eventually with a large sample size, the AB estimator may perform better when the
sample size is small, which is the harder case for conducting statistical analysis.
13The limiting distribution of n1{3 ppˆEM ´ pq is not the Normal distribution. The general theory of cube-root
asymptotics is developed in Kim and Pollard (1990)
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The question remains whether ppF q can be approximated by βµpF q for general distributions.
This amounts to whether the price-mean ratio, ppF q{µpF q, can be well-approximated by a constant
β. We already know from Figure 2 that for the Gamma distributions, the price-mean ratio is
bounded in r0.7, 1s, a rather tight interval. The next result shows the price-mean ratio can be
bounded likewise under assumptions a little stronger than regularity.
Proposition 5. Let F be a regular distribution.
(i) If the function f1´F is concave, then ppF q{µpF q ď 1.
(ii) If the function
λv ´ 1´ F pvq
fpvq (14)
is increasing w.r.t. v for some λ P r0, 1q. Then the price-mean ratio can be bounded as
p1´ λq 1λ
1´ F pppF qq ď ppF q{µpF q ď p1´ λq
´ 1
λ , (15)
where p1´ λq 1λ is taken to be e´1 (the limit) when λ “ 0.
This result demonstrates the theoretical possibility to bound the price-mean ratio. The condi-
tion that (14) is increasing is called λ-regularity in Schweizer and Szech (2019). The lower bound
in (15) contains the unknown ppF q, a crude bound can be obtained by replacing the denomina-
tor 1 ´ F pppF qq by 1. More discussions on the λ-regularity condition can be found in Cole and
Roughgarden (2014); Cole and Rao (2017). In Kleinberg and Yuan (2013), the conditon that
ppF q ě cµpF q for some c ą 0 is directly assumed under the name c-boundedness. They show that
this condition has attractive implications on the revenue to welfare ratio.
Apart from the theoretical result, Table 1 shows the numerical ranges of the price-ratio computed
for common distributions. For these distributions, the price-mean ratio is bounded around one.
For the log-normal distribution, the price-mean ratio can exceed one since the virtual valuation is
not always concave in this case. Note that the price-mean ratio is scale-invariant, thus the scale
parameter in parametric families can be set to 1 for the calculation.
5.2 Adaptive Average Bid Estimator
Consider an adaptive procedure for the AB estimator, where the coefficient β is estimated by
a pilot estimator. Let β˜ “ pˆEM{W¯n be the ratio between the EM estimator and the sample
average. Estimator β˜ itself cannot be directly used as the pilot because that would result in
the EM estimator. Instead, a coasening operation is applied. Consider rβ, β¯s as the interval
containing the true price-mean ratio, which can be derived based on Proposition 5 or Table 1. Let
β “ b0 ă b1 ă ¨ ¨ ¨ ă bLn “ β¯ be a set of Ln partitoning points of rβ, β¯s, which depends on the
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Distribution PDF Parameter p{µ
Light tail
Generalized Normal expp´vαq{Γ p1{αq α ě 1 r0.94, 1s
Gamma vα´1e´v{Γ pαq α ě 1 r0.7, 1s
Weibull αvα´1 expp´vαq α ě 1 r0.77, 1s
Heavy tail
Student t 2Γppα`1q{2q?
αpiΓpα{2q
´
1` v2α
¯´α`1
2
α ě 2 r0.78, 1s
Log-normal 1?
2piαv
exp
´
´ logpvq2
2α2
¯
α P p0, 1.5s r0.68, 1.4s
Pareto α p1` vq´α´1 α ą 1 1
Generalized Pareto p1` v{αq´α´1 α ą 1 1
Table 1: Price-mean Ratio of Common Regular Distributions.
sample size n. The pilot estimator βˆ is defined as the closest partitioning point to β˜, i.e.
βˆ “ bl, such that |bl ´ β˜| ď |bl1 ´ β˜|, for l1 “ 0, ¨ ¨ ¨ , Ln.14
The pilot estimator βˆ provides a simple way for choosing the coefficient for the AB estimator.
The adapted AB estimator is defined as the plug-in estimator pˆβˆ. If the partition gets dense in the
interval rβ, β¯s in a suitable rate as n increases, then the pilot estimator βˆ would become a n1{3-
consistent estimator of the price-mean ratio. Consequently, the adapted estimator pˆβˆ consistently
estimates ppF q with the n1{3 rate. So with this adaptive procedure, the AB estimator has the same
asymptotic properties as the EM estimator. This fact is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. Assume pˆEM is n
1{3-consistent and n1{3ppˆEM ´ ppF qq converges in distribution to
a absolute continous random variable.15 If the mesh of the partition satisfies
n1{3 max
1ďlďLn
|bl ´ bl´1| Ñ 0,
then both the pilot estimator βˆ and the adapted AB estimator pˆβˆ are n
1{3-consistent for ppF q{µpF q
and ppF q, respectively.
Simulation studies are conducted for several regular distributions, including Gamma, Gener-
alized Normal, Student-t, Lognormal, and Generalized Pareto. Here is a description of the simu-
lation procedure. Under each distribution, the optimal revenue is computed first. Then the AB
and EM estimators are simulated, each with 105 replications. The sample size n is chosen to be
10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 100, and 200. For the EM estimator, the top 10% of the sample is trimmed (not
considered in the maximization in (13)) for robustness against large observations. For the AB esti-
mator, the interval rβ, β¯s is chosen to be r0, 1.5s, and the mesh |bl´ bl´1| “ n´1{3{4. The estimates
are then transformed into realized revenues using the true DGP, and regret ratios are computed.
14Ties only occur with zero probability, so any tie-breaking rule can be used.
15Primitive conditions for this assumption can be found in Prasad (2008). The limiting distribution is the unique
maximizer of some Gaussian process (related to the Chernoff distribution), and is indeed absolute continuous.
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Summary statistics of the simulated regret ratios are reported in Appendix A. The value at risk
VaRδ% is the lower δ quantile of the regret ratio. The expected shortfall ESδ% is the conditional
expectation of the regret ratio given that it is lower than VaRδ%. Simulation results show that when
the sample size is large (n “ 100, 200), both the AB and EM estimators perform well. However,
when the sample size is small, the AB estimator has significantly better performance, especially in
terms of the risk measures VaR and ES. The improvement in ES can be as big as 30% of regret
ratio.
6 Conclusion
The AB procedure gives rise to a novel methodology that “regularizes” the estimation of a irregular
parameter. Such regularization depends on the existence of a regular parameter that universally ap-
proximates the irregular parameter under reasonable assumptions, which is a rather hard problem.
This method is new in the literature and further development of which is left for future works.
The AB estimator is a more competitive alternative for EM when data is sparse. There are
three reasons for emphasizing small sample cases in pricing problems. First, as an application of
the maxmin principle, a result was derived in the paper for cases with covariates, which showed
that only the sample data with the most relevant covariate value should be used for data analysis.
The practical implication is that the effective samples are going to be very small for each specific
auction. Second, for emerging markets, where the design of auction is most important, the amount
of data is arguable at a small level. Lastly, if the sample size is significant, then the choice of
statistical method is less critical for a good performance.
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A Simulation Results
Median Mean SD VaR5% VaR1% ES5%
Parameter n AB EM AB EM AB EM AB EM AB EM AB EM
1
10 0.92 0.85 0.96 0.93 0.10 0.19 0.70 0.43 0.56 0.21 0.61 0.30
20 0.93 0.89 0.96 0.95 0.08 0.15 0.77 0.54 0.67 0.31 0.71 0.40
30 0.95 0.91 0.97 0.96 0.06 0.13 0.82 0.62 0.73 0.39 0.77 0.48
40 0.95 0.93 0.97 0.97 0.05 0.11 0.84 0.69 0.77 0.47 0.79 0.56
50 0.96 0.94 0.98 0.97 0.05 0.09 0.85 0.74 0.78 0.54 0.81 0.62
100 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.04 0.06 0.90 0.85 0.85 0.72 0.87 0.77
200 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.03 0.03 0.92 0.91 0.88 0.84 0.90 0.87
3
10 0.90 0.89 0.95 0.95 0.14 0.16 0.59 0.52 0.41 0.24 0.48 0.36
20 0.93 0.93 0.97 0.97 0.10 0.10 0.72 0.72 0.54 0.50 0.61 0.59
30 0.95 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.07 0.08 0.80 0.80 0.64 0.64 0.70 0.70
40 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.06 0.06 0.83 0.83 0.70 0.70 0.75 0.75
50 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.05 0.05 0.86 0.86 0.75 0.75 0.79 0.80
100 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.03 0.03 0.92 0.92 0.85 0.85 0.88 0.88
200 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.02 0.02 0.95 0.95 0.91 0.91 0.93 0.93
5
10 0.91 0.91 0.96 0.96 0.13 0.13 0.63 0.63 0.41 0.37 0.49 0.48
20 0.94 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.08 0.08 0.78 0.78 0.60 0.60 0.67 0.67
30 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.06 0.06 0.84 0.84 0.71 0.71 0.76 0.76
40 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.05 0.05 0.87 0.87 0.76 0.77 0.80 0.81
50 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.04 0.04 0.89 0.89 0.80 0.80 0.83 0.84
100 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.02 0.02 0.93 0.94 0.88 0.89 0.90 0.90
200 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.96 0.96 0.93 0.93 0.94 0.94
7
10 0.92 0.92 0.96 0.97 0.12 0.12 0.67 0.67 0.44 0.44 0.53 0.53
20 0.95 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.07 0.07 0.80 0.81 0.65 0.65 0.71 0.71
30 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.05 0.05 0.85 0.86 0.74 0.74 0.78 0.79
40 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.04 0.04 0.88 0.89 0.79 0.79 0.83 0.83
50 0.97 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.04 0.04 0.90 0.91 0.83 0.83 0.85 0.86
100 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.02 0.02 0.94 0.94 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.92
200 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.01 0.01 0.97 0.97 0.94 0.94 0.95 0.95
Table 2: Simulation Results under Gamma Distribution.
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Median Mean SD VaR5% VaR1% ES5%
Parameter n AB EM AB EM AB EM AB EM AB EM AB EM
2
10 0.92 0.88 0.96 0.93 0.10 0.13 0.70 0.60 0.55 0.43 0.61 0.50
20 0.95 0.90 0.97 0.95 0.07 0.11 0.80 0.67 0.67 0.52 0.72 0.58
30 0.96 0.91 0.98 0.95 0.06 0.10 0.83 0.70 0.73 0.57 0.77 0.62
40 0.96 0.92 0.98 0.96 0.05 0.09 0.86 0.73 0.76 0.61 0.80 0.65
50 0.97 0.93 0.98 0.96 0.05 0.09 0.87 0.74 0.79 0.64 0.82 0.68
100 0.98 0.94 0.99 0.97 0.03 0.07 0.91 0.79 0.85 0.71 0.87 0.74
200 0.98 0.96 0.99 0.98 0.02 0.05 0.93 0.84 0.89 0.77 0.91 0.80
5
10 0.92 0.85 0.96 0.92 0.10 0.17 0.70 0.47 0.55 0.27 0.60 0.35
20 0.94 0.88 0.97 0.94 0.07 0.15 0.79 0.53 0.67 0.34 0.72 0.42
30 0.95 0.90 0.97 0.96 0.06 0.13 0.83 0.59 0.74 0.41 0.78 0.48
40 0.96 0.91 0.98 0.96 0.05 0.12 0.85 0.64 0.78 0.45 0.81 0.53
50 0.96 0.92 0.98 0.97 0.04 0.11 0.88 0.67 0.81 0.49 0.84 0.56
100 0.97 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.03 0.07 0.91 0.80 0.87 0.63 0.89 0.70
200 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.02 0.04 0.93 0.89 0.91 0.79 0.92 0.83
7
10 0.92 0.85 0.96 0.92 0.10 0.18 0.70 0.45 0.55 0.24 0.61 0.32
20 0.94 0.88 0.97 0.94 0.07 0.15 0.79 0.53 0.68 0.32 0.73 0.41
30 0.95 0.90 0.97 0.96 0.06 0.14 0.84 0.59 0.75 0.39 0.78 0.47
40 0.96 0.92 0.98 0.97 0.05 0.12 0.85 0.64 0.78 0.44 0.81 0.52
50 0.96 0.93 0.98 0.97 0.04 0.11 0.88 0.69 0.81 0.49 0.84 0.57
100 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.03 0.07 0.91 0.82 0.87 0.66 0.89 0.72
200 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.02 0.04 0.93 0.90 0.91 0.81 0.92 0.84
10
10 0.92 0.85 0.96 0.92 0.10 0.18 0.70 0.44 0.55 0.23 0.61 0.31
20 0.94 0.88 0.97 0.95 0.07 0.16 0.79 0.52 0.69 0.31 0.73 0.40
30 0.95 0.90 0.97 0.96 0.06 0.14 0.84 0.60 0.75 0.38 0.78 0.47
40 0.96 0.92 0.98 0.97 0.05 0.12 0.86 0.66 0.79 0.44 0.81 0.53
50 0.96 0.93 0.98 0.97 0.04 0.10 0.88 0.70 0.81 0.50 0.84 0.58
100 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.03 0.06 0.91 0.83 0.87 0.68 0.89 0.74
200 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.02 0.04 0.93 0.90 0.91 0.82 0.92 0.85
15
10 0.92 0.85 0.96 0.92 0.10 0.19 0.70 0.43 0.55 0.22 0.61 0.30
20 0.94 0.88 0.97 0.95 0.07 0.16 0.80 0.53 0.69 0.31 0.74 0.40
30 0.95 0.91 0.97 0.96 0.06 0.13 0.84 0.60 0.76 0.39 0.79 0.47
40 0.96 0.92 0.98 0.97 0.05 0.11 0.86 0.67 0.79 0.45 0.81 0.54
50 0.96 0.93 0.98 0.97 0.04 0.10 0.88 0.72 0.82 0.52 0.84 0.60
100 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.03 0.06 0.91 0.84 0.87 0.69 0.89 0.75
200 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.02 0.04 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.83 0.92 0.86
Table 3: Simulation Results under Generalized Normal Distribution.
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Median Mean SD VaR5% VaR1% ES5%
Parameter n AB EM AB EM AB EM AB EM AB EM AB EM
1.5
10 0.91 0.88 0.95 0.93 0.11 0.14 0.69 0.59 0.54 0.44 0.59 0.50
20 0.93 0.89 0.96 0.94 0.09 0.12 0.75 0.63 0.62 0.51 0.66 0.55
30 0.94 0.90 0.96 0.95 0.08 0.11 0.78 0.66 0.67 0.55 0.70 0.59
40 0.94 0.91 0.96 0.95 0.07 0.11 0.79 0.67 0.68 0.58 0.72 0.61
50 0.94 0.91 0.97 0.96 0.07 0.10 0.81 0.69 0.71 0.60 0.74 0.63
100 0.96 0.94 0.98 0.97 0.05 0.08 0.85 0.74 0.76 0.66 0.79 0.69
200 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.04 0.06 0.88 0.81 0.81 0.71 0.83 0.75
2
10 0.90 0.85 0.95 0.92 0.12 0.18 0.64 0.46 0.46 0.30 0.53 0.37
20 0.92 0.87 0.96 0.94 0.10 0.16 0.71 0.51 0.56 0.36 0.62 0.42
30 0.93 0.89 0.96 0.95 0.08 0.14 0.76 0.56 0.62 0.41 0.67 0.46
40 0.94 0.91 0.97 0.96 0.08 0.13 0.78 0.60 0.65 0.44 0.70 0.50
50 0.94 0.92 0.97 0.97 0.07 0.12 0.80 0.63 0.69 0.48 0.74 0.54
100 0.96 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.05 0.08 0.86 0.79 0.78 0.60 0.81 0.68
200 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.04 0.04 0.90 0.89 0.84 0.78 0.86 0.82
5
10 0.90 0.85 0.95 0.93 0.12 0.19 0.65 0.40 0.47 0.19 0.54 0.27
20 0.93 0.90 0.96 0.96 0.09 0.15 0.75 0.56 0.62 0.29 0.67 0.40
30 0.94 0.92 0.97 0.97 0.07 0.12 0.80 0.68 0.69 0.41 0.73 0.52
40 0.95 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.06 0.10 0.82 0.74 0.73 0.52 0.76 0.61
50 0.96 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.05 0.08 0.85 0.79 0.77 0.61 0.80 0.68
100 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.04 0.05 0.89 0.88 0.84 0.78 0.86 0.82
200 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.03 0.03 0.93 0.93 0.88 0.87 0.90 0.89
10
10 0.91 0.86 0.95 0.94 0.11 0.19 0.67 0.42 0.50 0.19 0.57 0.28
20 0.93 0.91 0.97 0.96 0.08 0.14 0.77 0.61 0.65 0.34 0.69 0.45
30 0.95 0.93 0.97 0.97 0.06 0.10 0.81 0.72 0.72 0.49 0.76 0.58
40 0.95 0.94 0.98 0.98 0.06 0.08 0.83 0.78 0.75 0.59 0.78 0.66
50 0.96 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.05 0.07 0.86 0.81 0.78 0.65 0.81 0.71
100 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.03 0.04 0.90 0.89 0.85 0.80 0.87 0.83
200 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.02 0.02 0.94 0.94 0.89 0.88 0.91 0.90
15
10 0.91 0.86 0.95 0.94 0.11 0.18 0.67 0.44 0.51 0.19 0.58 0.29
20 0.94 0.91 0.97 0.96 0.08 0.13 0.77 0.63 0.66 0.37 0.70 0.48
30 0.95 0.93 0.97 0.97 0.06 0.10 0.82 0.73 0.72 0.52 0.76 0.60
40 0.95 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.06 0.08 0.83 0.78 0.75 0.60 0.78 0.67
50 0.96 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.05 0.07 0.86 0.82 0.79 0.67 0.81 0.72
100 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.03 0.04 0.90 0.89 0.85 0.80 0.87 0.84
200 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.02 0.02 0.94 0.94 0.89 0.89 0.91 0.90
Table 4: Simulation Results under Student-t Distribution.
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Median Mean SD VaR5% VaR1% ES5%
Parameter n AB EM AB EM AB EM AB EM AB EM AB EM
1.5
10 0.90 0.89 0.95 0.94 0.12 0.13 0.65 0.62 0.49 0.46 0.55 0.52
20 0.94 0.92 0.97 0.96 0.08 0.09 0.77 0.72 0.63 0.59 0.69 0.64
30 0.95 0.94 0.98 0.97 0.06 0.08 0.82 0.77 0.70 0.66 0.75 0.71
40 0.96 0.94 0.98 0.97 0.06 0.07 0.84 0.80 0.74 0.70 0.78 0.74
50 0.97 0.95 0.99 0.97 0.05 0.06 0.87 0.82 0.77 0.73 0.81 0.77
100 0.98 0.96 0.99 0.98 0.03 0.04 0.91 0.87 0.84 0.81 0.87 0.84
200 0.99 0.97 1.00 0.98 0.02 0.03 0.94 0.91 0.89 0.87 0.91 0.88
1.2
10 0.92 0.88 0.96 0.93 0.10 0.14 0.72 0.57 0.57 0.37 0.62 0.45
20 0.94 0.89 0.97 0.94 0.07 0.13 0.79 0.63 0.67 0.46 0.72 0.52
30 0.95 0.91 0.97 0.95 0.06 0.11 0.83 0.66 0.73 0.52 0.77 0.57
40 0.96 0.91 0.97 0.96 0.05 0.10 0.85 0.69 0.77 0.56 0.80 0.61
50 0.96 0.92 0.97 0.96 0.05 0.10 0.86 0.71 0.79 0.59 0.81 0.63
100 0.97 0.94 0.98 0.97 0.03 0.08 0.90 0.77 0.85 0.67 0.87 0.71
200 0.98 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.03 0.06 0.92 0.84 0.89 0.74 0.90 0.78
1.0
10 0.91 0.85 0.95 0.92 0.11 0.17 0.67 0.47 0.52 0.28 0.58 0.35
20 0.92 0.88 0.95 0.94 0.09 0.16 0.73 0.52 0.61 0.34 0.66 0.41
30 0.93 0.89 0.96 0.95 0.08 0.14 0.77 0.57 0.68 0.40 0.71 0.47
40 0.94 0.91 0.96 0.96 0.07 0.13 0.79 0.61 0.71 0.45 0.74 0.51
50 0.94 0.92 0.97 0.97 0.07 0.11 0.80 0.65 0.72 0.48 0.75 0.55
100 0.96 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.05 0.08 0.85 0.79 0.80 0.61 0.82 0.69
200 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.04 0.04 0.89 0.89 0.84 0.78 0.86 0.82
0.7
10 0.88 0.85 0.94 0.94 0.15 0.20 0.56 0.37 0.39 0.16 0.45 0.24
20 0.91 0.90 0.96 0.96 0.12 0.15 0.64 0.58 0.48 0.28 0.54 0.41
30 0.93 0.93 0.97 0.97 0.09 0.11 0.72 0.70 0.57 0.45 0.63 0.55
40 0.95 0.94 0.98 0.98 0.08 0.09 0.77 0.77 0.62 0.56 0.68 0.65
50 0.95 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.07 0.07 0.81 0.81 0.66 0.64 0.72 0.71
100 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.04 0.04 0.89 0.90 0.80 0.80 0.84 0.84
200 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.02 0.02 0.94 0.94 0.89 0.89 0.91 0.91
0.5
10 0.90 0.89 0.96 0.96 0.14 0.16 0.56 0.55 0.35 0.25 0.43 0.37
20 0.94 0.94 0.97 0.97 0.09 0.10 0.74 0.74 0.53 0.53 0.62 0.62
30 0.95 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.07 0.07 0.82 0.82 0.66 0.66 0.72 0.72
40 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.06 0.05 0.85 0.86 0.73 0.74 0.78 0.78
50 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.05 0.05 0.88 0.88 0.78 0.78 0.81 0.82
100 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.03 0.03 0.93 0.93 0.87 0.87 0.89 0.90
200 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.02 0.02 0.96 0.96 0.92 0.93 0.94 0.94
Table 5: Simulation Results under Lognormal Distribution.
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Median Mean SD VaR5% VaR1% ES5%
Parameter n AB EM AB EM AB EM AB EM AB EM AB EM
2
10 0.92 0.88 0.96 0.93 0.10 0.13 0.70 0.60 0.55 0.43 0.61 0.50
20 0.95 0.90 0.97 0.95 0.07 0.11 0.80 0.67 0.67 0.52 0.72 0.58
30 0.96 0.91 0.98 0.95 0.06 0.10 0.83 0.70 0.73 0.57 0.77 0.62
40 0.96 0.92 0.98 0.96 0.05 0.09 0.86 0.73 0.76 0.61 0.80 0.65
50 0.97 0.93 0.98 0.96 0.05 0.09 0.87 0.74 0.79 0.64 0.82 0.68
100 0.98 0.94 0.99 0.97 0.03 0.07 0.91 0.79 0.85 0.71 0.87 0.74
200 0.98 0.96 0.99 0.98 0.02 0.05 0.93 0.84 0.89 0.77 0.91 0.80
5
10 0.92 0.85 0.96 0.92 0.10 0.17 0.70 0.47 0.55 0.27 0.60 0.35
20 0.94 0.88 0.97 0.94 0.07 0.15 0.79 0.53 0.67 0.34 0.72 0.42
30 0.95 0.90 0.97 0.96 0.06 0.13 0.83 0.59 0.74 0.41 0.78 0.48
40 0.96 0.91 0.98 0.96 0.05 0.12 0.85 0.64 0.78 0.45 0.81 0.53
50 0.96 0.92 0.98 0.97 0.04 0.11 0.88 0.67 0.81 0.49 0.84 0.56
100 0.97 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.03 0.07 0.91 0.80 0.87 0.63 0.89 0.70
200 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.02 0.04 0.93 0.89 0.91 0.79 0.92 0.83
7
10 0.92 0.85 0.96 0.92 0.10 0.18 0.70 0.45 0.55 0.24 0.61 0.32
20 0.94 0.88 0.97 0.94 0.07 0.15 0.79 0.53 0.68 0.32 0.73 0.41
30 0.95 0.90 0.97 0.96 0.06 0.14 0.84 0.59 0.75 0.39 0.78 0.47
40 0.96 0.92 0.98 0.97 0.05 0.12 0.85 0.64 0.78 0.44 0.81 0.52
50 0.96 0.93 0.98 0.97 0.04 0.11 0.88 0.69 0.81 0.49 0.84 0.57
100 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.03 0.07 0.91 0.82 0.87 0.66 0.89 0.72
200 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.02 0.04 0.93 0.90 0.91 0.81 0.92 0.84
10
10 0.92 0.85 0.96 0.92 0.10 0.18 0.70 0.44 0.55 0.23 0.61 0.31
20 0.94 0.88 0.97 0.95 0.07 0.16 0.79 0.52 0.69 0.31 0.73 0.40
30 0.95 0.90 0.97 0.96 0.06 0.14 0.84 0.60 0.75 0.38 0.78 0.47
40 0.96 0.92 0.98 0.97 0.05 0.12 0.86 0.66 0.79 0.44 0.81 0.53
50 0.96 0.93 0.98 0.97 0.04 0.10 0.88 0.70 0.81 0.50 0.84 0.58
100 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.03 0.06 0.91 0.83 0.87 0.68 0.89 0.74
200 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.02 0.04 0.93 0.90 0.91 0.82 0.92 0.85
15
10 0.92 0.85 0.96 0.92 0.10 0.19 0.70 0.43 0.55 0.22 0.61 0.30
20 0.94 0.88 0.97 0.95 0.07 0.16 0.80 0.53 0.69 0.31 0.74 0.40
30 0.95 0.91 0.97 0.96 0.06 0.13 0.84 0.60 0.76 0.39 0.79 0.47
40 0.96 0.92 0.98 0.97 0.05 0.11 0.86 0.67 0.79 0.45 0.81 0.54
50 0.96 0.93 0.98 0.97 0.04 0.10 0.88 0.72 0.82 0.52 0.84 0.60
100 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.03 0.06 0.91 0.84 0.87 0.69 0.89 0.75
200 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.02 0.04 0.93 0.91 0.91 0.83 0.92 0.86
Table 6: Simulation Results under Generalized Pareto Distribution.
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B Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. This result follows from standard arguments for DSIC auction design. See, for
example, Chapter 4 in Bo¨rgers (2015).
Proof of Lemma 2. By definition,
φFθpθppF qq “ θp´
1´ FθpθppF qq
fθpθppF qq “ θ
ˆ
ppF q ´ 1´ F pppF qq
fpppF qq
˙
“ 0.
Thus ppFθq “ θppF q. The Myerson auction under Fθ is
qFθi pvq “ 1tvi ą max
i1‰i vi
1 , vi ą θppF qu.
The optimal revenue is
RpFθq “
kÿ
i“1
ż
Rk`
1tvi ą max
i1‰i vi
1 , vi ą θppF qu
ˆ
vi ´ 1´ Fθpviq
fθpviq
˙ kź
i“1
fθpviqdv
“
kÿ
i“1
ż
Rk`
1
"
vi
θ
ą max
i1‰i
vi1
θ
,
vi
θ
ą ppF q
*
θ
ˆ
vi
θ
´ 1´ F p
vi
θ q
fpviθ q
˙ kź
i“1
f
´vi
θ
¯
d
ˆ
1
θ
v
˙
“ θRpF q.
Proof of Lemma 3. Using the revenue equivalence result in Lemma 1, we have
tipθv, θwq “ θviqipθv, θwq ´
ż θvi
0
qippu, θv´iq, θwqdu
“ θqipθv, θwq ´ θ
ż vi
0
qippu,v´iq,wqdu
“ θtipv,wq.
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof follows closely the proof of Proposition 3 in Stoye (2009). Define
the prior p˜i˚ P ∆ `FX ˘ by p˜i˚ “śxPX pi˚. By construction, the marginals of p˜i˚ are all identical to
pi˚, while the states tFxu are mutually independent. We want to show that pκ˚, p˜i˚q forms a Nash
equilibrium. For x ‰ x1, the independence between Fx and Fx1 (under prior p˜i˚) implies that Wx1
is uninformative about Fx. Thus κx˚ is a best response against p˜i
˚. Next, given that the auctioneer
picks κx˚, the conditional regret ratio is r
´
κx˚, F˜
¯
. By the definition of κx˚, this regret ratio equals
to the one from applying q˚ to the tuple pV,Wxq. Thus nature is best responding by using any
prior that has marginal distributions equal to pi˚.
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Proof of Propsition 3. Due to Proposition 2, the regret ratio is the same for all θ. So we can let
θ “ 1 and consider the distribution F . Thus the denominator of the regret ratio can be omitted.
The problem is to find the allocation q that maximizes the revenue:
max
qPQ Rpq, F q “
kÿ
i“1
E rqipV,WqφF pViqs
s.t. qi P r0, 1s,
ÿ
i
qi ď 1, and qi scale-invariant.
We can restrict the qi’s to be either 1 or 0 because a qi taking values in p0, 1q can never be optimal
unless there are equal bids, which happens with probability zero. The maxmization can be achieved
in two steps. In the first step, we solve the maxmization of (9) for each qi without imposing the
restriction that
ř
i qi ď 1. By monotonicity of qi in Vi and scale-invariance, the solution is of the
form 1tVi ě ρF pV´i,Wqu, where ρF is homogeneous of degree 1. ρF is symmetric and does not
depend on i due to the symmetry in the maximization problem. Then in the second step we can
pick among the non-zero qi’s a unique one to be 1. Since φF is increasing, we should choose the i
with the largest Vi, which leads to the expression 1tVi ą maxi1‰i Vi1u. Notice that this expression
satisfies the monotonicity and scale-invariance properties. Combining the two steps, we get the
expression (8).
For the last statement, consider the average bid auction defined by Equation (11). When
β “ ppF q{µpF q is the true price-mean ratio, βS¯´i is consistent for ppF q as mintk, nu Ñ 8. In this
case, the regret ratio of the AB-β auction converges to 1. Now since the auction with ρF maximizes
the regret ratio among all equivariant auctions, its regret ratio must also converge to 1. This means
ρF must converges in probability to the true optimal price ppF q since ρF pV´i,Wq is independent
of Vi.
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider a one-dimensional regular parametric submodel with parameter
β. The PDF and CDP are parametrized as fp¨, ηq and F p¨, ηq respectively. The true probability
distribution is indexed by η0. The parameter ppF q is implicitly defined through
ppηqfpppηq, ηq ´ p1´ F pppηq, ηqq “ 0.
Denote the true optimal price by p0 “ ppη0q. By the implicit function theorem, the derivative of p
with respect to η is
d
dη
ppηq|η“η0 “ ´Fηpp0, η0q ` p0fηpp0, η0q2fpp0, η0q ` p0fppp0, η0q . (16)
The goal is to turn the above expression into a linear function of the score function sp¨, ηq “ fηp¨,η0qfp¨,η0q .
The denominator in Equation (16) is constant when the true distribution fp¨, η0q is fixed, thus can
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be ignored. The first term in the numerator, Fη, can be written as
Fηpp0, η0q “ BBη
ż
1rv,p0spuqfpu, ηqdu
ˇˇˇ
η“η0
“
ż
1rv,p0spuqfηpu, η0qdu
“ Eη0
“
1rv,p0spV qspV, η0q
‰
,
which is a continuous, linear functional of sp¨, η0q. The second term in the numerator is p0fηpp0, η0q,
where p0 is a constant. The term
fηpp0, η0q “ spp0, η0qfpp0, ηq,
where fpp0, ηq is again a constant. It boils down to the term spp0, η0q, which can be thought of
as the Dirac delta δp0 applied to the score sp¨, η0q, where δp0psq evaluates a function s at p0. The
functional δp0 is indeed linear. However, it is not bounded in the Hilbert space L2pF p¨, η0qq, thus
not continuous. Hence the RHS of Equation (16) is not a continuous, linear operator of the score
function. Thus the parameter ppF q is not pathwise differentiable.
Proof of Proposition 5. When the hazard rate is concave, so is the virtual valuation function φ.
By Jensen’s inequality, we have φppq “ 0 “ E rφpV qs ď φpµq. Thus p ď µ. For the second result,
the lower bound follows directly from Proposition 7 in Schweizer and Szech (2019). For the upper
bound, we have
µpF q “
ż 8
0
1´ F pvqdv ě ppF qp1´ F pppF qqq ě ppF qp1´ λq1{λ,
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 3 in Schweizer and Szech (2019).
Proof of Proposition 6. By the assumption on pˆEM, we know β˜ is n
1{3-consistent for p{µ and
n1{3pβ˜ ´ p{µq converges in distribution to a absolute continous random variable. For βˆ, consider
any  ą 0, we have
P
´
n1{3|βˆ ´ p{µ| ě 
¯
“ P
´
|βˆ ´ p{µ| ě n´1{3
¯
ď P
´
|β˜ ´ p{µ| ě n´1{3
¯
` P
ˆ
|β˜ ´ p{µ| ă max
1ďlďLn
|bl ´ bl´1|
˙
,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that
|β˜ ´ p{µ| ď |βˆ ´ p{µ| ùñ |βˆ ´ p{µ| ă max
1ďlďLn
|bl ´ bl´1|.
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By the condition n1{3 max1ďlďLn |bl ´ bl´1| Ñ 0, we have
P
ˆ
|β˜ ´ p{µ| ă max
1ďlďLn
|bl ´ bl´1|
˙
“ P
ˆ
n1{3|β˜ ´ p{µ| ă n1{3 max
1ďlďLn
|bl ´ bl´1|
˙
Ñ 0.
So βˆ is n1{3-consistent. Then pˆβˆ is also n
1{3-consistent since
n1{3ppˆβˆ ´ pq “ n1{3pβˆW¯n ´ pp{µqW¯n ` pp{µqW¯n ´ pq
“ n1{3pβˆ ´ p{µqW¯n ` n1{3pp{µqpW¯n ´ µq “ Opp1q.
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